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Economics of disagreement
–
financial intuition for the Re´nyi divergence∗
Andrei N. Soklakov†
Disagreement is an essential element of science and life in general. The amount
of disagreement is often quantified by highly abstract entropic measures such as
the Re´nyi divergence. Despite their widespread use in science and engineering,
such quantities lack numerical intuition and their axiomatic definitions contain
no practical insight as to how the disagreement can be resolved. An economic
approach addresses both of these problems by transforming disagreements into
tangible investment opportunities. The Re´nyi divergence appears connected to
the optimized performance of such investments. Optimization around individual
opinions provides a social mechanism by which funds flow naturally to support
a more accurate view. Such social mechanisms can help to resolve difficult
disagreements (e.g., financial arguments concerning future climate).
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1 Introduction
In a lot of practical situations people’s knowledge and beliefs can be expressed in terms of
possible events and their probabilities. In such situations disagreements can be understood
as a mismatch between different probability distributions advocated by different people.
The extent of disagreement between probability distributions can then be measured by
the specially designed mathematical quantities called divergences. Relative entropy [1]
and its celebrated generalization – the Re´nyi divergence [2] – are among the best known
examples of such quantities.
Unfortunately, as we demonstrate by example, the numerical values of abstract diver-
gences are difficult to interpret. Moreover, their axiomatic definitions contain no real
insight as to how one can resolve the underlying disagreements in practice.
The lack of accurate intuition has always been a major problem in the fields of probability
and statistics, yet one particular technique of gaining statistical intuition appears to
transcend the centuries. The technique involves imagining a game of chance (throwing
dice, tossing coins, playing cards and lotteries) with well-defined financial outcomes.
In 1956 Kelly used this pedagogical technique to propose an apparently very general
and intuitive interpretation of relative entropy [3]. Kelly considered a growth-optimizing
investor in a game with mutually exclusive outcomes (a “horse race”) and showed that
the rate of return expected by such an investor is equal to the relative entropy between
the investor’s believed probabilities and the official odds.
Effectively, Kelly showed that a growth-optimizing investor would expect on average to
convert 1 bit of additional information (relative entropy) into 100% in financial returns.
Notwithstanding the mathematics, Kelly’s interpretation has been vigorously criticized by
Samuelson as dangerous on the grounds that most people are not growth-optimizing [4, 5]
so, Samuelson argued, the resulting financial intuition may be misleading.
Here we show that the connection between information and real-life expected returns is
in fact very robust and more scientifically nuanced than previously thought.
Relative to the Kelly information benchmark, people’s natural risk aversion does cause a
drop in expected returns. However, the amount of the drop is also information-driven:
in the case of constant relative risk aversion, for example, it is proportional to the ab-
solute difference between the relative entropy and the Re´nyi divergence. In other words,
attempts to challenge the economic intuition with more general investment behaviors
simply upgrade it for a wider class of divergence measures.
Having said that, the real investors are not completely general (mathematically speaking).
So there are scientific limits beyond which the financial intuition should not be applied.
We show where these limits are in the case of the Re´nyi divergence.
Given the widespread use of the Re´nyi divergence in science and engineering, and because
financial returns are easier to imagine (compared to abstract entropic quantities) we expect
this economic intuition to become useful in a broad range of fields.
We also show how one can use the economic approach in its own right as a practical
instrument for resolving disagreements, raising financial support and accelerating the
adoption of sound scientific developments.
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2 Results
2.1 Derivations
A game of chance is defined by a random variable, X , and a payoff function, F . The
value F (x) states the amount of reward associated with a particular outcome, x, of the
variable. This technical definition covers many practical situations. For instance, F (x)
might denote the payout for medical insurance in the event of a diagnosis x.
Consider an investor who is interested in finding the optimal shape of F so as to maximize
their benefit. Following von Neumann and Morgenstern [6] we understand the benefit as
the expected utility of the payoff
EbU [F ]
def
=
∫
b(x)U(F (x)) dx , (1)
where U is the utility function and b is the investor-believed probability distribution for
the variable X . It is important to remember that both the probability distribution b and
the utility function U reflect the investor’s personal understanding of the game.
When maximizing EbU the investor is subject to a budget constraint. To state this
constraint mathematically we need the ability to price the game. Assuming a very general
setting which is used in the financial industry we write the fair price of F as the average
Price[F ]
def
=
∫
F (x)m(x) dx , (2)
where the positive-valued function m summarizes the relative prices of ensuring against
every outcome x of the variable X . In game-theoretic illustrations this is often stated
in terms of “odds”; economists would recognize this as Arrow-Debreu prices. For our
purposes, the important point to remember is that m is a given property of the market
and the investor has no choice but to take it into account when understanding their
budget. For simplicity we assume that m is a probability distribution (“fair odds”) and
that Price[F ] = 1.
The payoff F which achieves the maximum of EbU [F ] under the constraint Price[F ] = 1
satisfies the payoff elasticity equation [7]
d lnF
d ln f
=
1
R
, (3)
where f = b/m and R = −FU ′′FF/U
′
F is the Arrow-Pratt risk aversion. This equation
is used in finance to produce information derivatives – financial instruments which are
derived from all relevant information (including market-implied m and investor-believed
b and R).
Kelly’s intuition concerns the important special case of R = 1. This is the famous case
of the growth-optimizing investor which was first introduced by Bernoulli in 1738 [8].
Indeed, when R = 1 the utility function U(F ) ∝ ln(F/Price[F ]) + const, so the investor
is optimizing the expected logarithmic rate of return:
EbRate[F ] =
∫
b(x) Rate(F (x)) dx , Rate(F (x))
def
= ln
(
F (x)/Price[F ]
)
. (4)
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Kelly studied the growth-optimizing investor in detail and showed that under some natural
assumptions the investor’s expectation for the logarithmic rate of return is exactly the
relative entropy [3]. The reader can verify this result independently by substituting R = 1
into Eq. (3) and computing
max
F
Eb Rate[F ] = EbRate[f ]
=
∫
b(x) ln
b(x)
m(x)
dx . (5)
This is the mathematical essence of Kelly’s game-theoretic (financial) interpretation for
the information rate.
Kelly’s interpretation depends on the investor to be growth-optimizing. According to
Samuelson, this is a major weakness which limits (if not prevents) any use of Kelly’s
interpretation in practice [4, 5].
In an entirely separate argument, Re´nyi considered the core mathematical properties
of information, formulated them as axioms, and recognized relative entropy (the last
expression in Eq. (5)) as a special case of a much larger class of information measures [2].
This class is spanned by linear combinations of the quantities
Dα(b||m)
def
=
1
α− 1
ln
∫
b(x)
( b(x)
m(x)
)α−1
dx (6)
with different values of α. An individual Dα(b||m) is called Re´nyi’s divergence of order
α of a probability distribution b from another distribution m. The relative entropy is
included in this definition as the limiting case [2]
D1(b||m)
def
= lim
α→1
Dα(b||m) =
∫
b(x) ln
b(x)
m(x)
dx . (7)
In what follows we show that Samuelson’s demands for a more general economic setup and
Re´nyi’s generalization of the relative entropy are in fact a statement and a solution of the
same economic problem which translates information content (captured as disagreement
between distributions) into financial returns.
Let us consider an investor with an arbitrary constant relative risk aversion, R = const.
Unless R = 1, i.e. unless the investor is growth-optimizing, the growth rate expected by
the investor will be smaller than the Kelly benchmark (5). The natural question to ask
is how much smaller. Using Eq. (3) we derive the optimal payoff
F (x) =
f 1/R(x)
Price[f 1/R]
. (8)
By direct substitution into Eq (4) we compute
Eb Rate[F ] =
1
R
EbRate[f ] +
R− 1
R
D1/R(b||m) . (9)
As a side observation, the reader might be interested to note that the structure of this
expression is rather general. In particular, by replacing the investor-believed distribution
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b with any other distribution p one can prove a much more general law with the exact
same structure. Expanding EpRate[f ] = D1(p||m)−D1(p||b) one can write this as
Ep Rate[F ] =
1
R
(
D1(p||m)−D1(p||b)
)
+
R− 1
R
D1/R(b||m) . (10)
In other words, one can talk about the investor-expected returns (p = b) or look at the
actual realized returns (in which case p coincides with the actual distribution for X) or
we can take the perspective of a totally independent observer who computes expectations
using a very different distribution p and, in all of these cases, the effect of risk aversion
on the financial performance of the growth-optimizing investor would follow the same
universal law (10).
Coming back to the investor-expected returns, let us investigate the drop in the expected
return of F relative to the growth-optimizing f . Using the Kelly result, EbRate[f ] =
D1(b||m), we compute from Eq. (9)
EbRate[f ]− EbRate[F ] =
R− 1
R
(
D1(b||m)−D1/R(b||m)
)
. (11)
Using the fact that Dα is a nondecreasing function in α we can rewrite this as
EbRate[f ]− EbRate[F ] =
|R− 1|
R
∣∣∣D1 −D1/R
∣∣∣ . (12)
Equations (10) and (12) convert the abstract axiomatically-motivated measure of Re´nyi
divergence into a much more intuitive measure of financial returns. This is the point where
pure and simple mathematics turns into science about the real world, so we need to be
extra careful: we need to understand the limitations of the resulting economic intuition
before it can be used in practice.
2.2 Reality check
Using the rational part of Samuelson’s critique as an inspiration, we demand, as a matter
of principle, that economic intuition can only be based on realistic investors. Failing
that, the researcher might not be able to relate to the hypothetical investor’s experience
correctly, so the resulting economic intuition might be flawed.
Putting aside the information-theoretic definitions, we recognize financial returns (10)
and (12) as a direct consequence of the payoff elasticity equation (3). We therefore require
Eq. (3) to be tested against the objective records for its ability to explain the observed
financial returns.
It turns out that the exact same usage of Eq. (3) as we employed in this paper does indeed
explain the observed equity returns [9]. This includes both the forecasted and the realized
returns.
Understanding equity returns gives us experimentally confirmed boundaries for risk aver-
sion within which our arguments can be confidently applied. The values of R correspond-
ing to the forecasted returns were mostly in the range between 1 and 2.5 (see Fig. 2
of [9]).
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The range of R explaining the realized returns was slightly wider: between 0.5 and 3 (see
Fig. 4 of [9]). Here we should note that, unlike forecasted returns, realized returns are
expected to overestimate the range for R. This is because real investors do make some
mistakes in their forecasts. For example, we can find historical periods with negative
realized returns. Rational investors would accept negative returns only if they had very
low levels of risk aversion. In reality, however, the investors can enter a negative period
unawares so their actual R might not be as low as suggested by the data. By trying
to explain all of the data (as was done in [9]) we assume that the investor foresaw the
realized distribution of returns and invested in full knowledge of that distribution. This
overestimates the range of R that is necessary to explain the observations.
For completeness we note that the above ranges correspond to equity investors as observed
over finite time periods (daily observations from 17 May 2000 to 27 April 2015 for the
realized returns and monthly observations from September 2008 to March 2015 for the
forecasted returns). Future investigations using Eq. (3) for different types of investors (not
necessarily equity) and considering broader time periods will deepen our understanding
of the possible ranges for R and this, in turn, will provide better intuition over the Re´nyi
parameter α.
2.3 Illustration
We promised the reader an intuitive economic intuition for the Re´nyi divergence. To
see how this works, let us take Dα(b||m) as a function of α for some pair of probability
distributions b and m (see, for example, Fig. 1A). The distributions themselves can be
very difficult to illustrate (e.g. very high dimensional or even unknown). Our task is
to understand intuitively the amount of disagreement between the distributions using
nothing but the data in Fig. 1A. To this end we use Eq. (12) and transform the Re´nyi
profile of Fig. 1A into the expected rate of return EbRate[F ] as a function of risk aversion
(see Fig. 1B). The following story illustrates the benefits of this transformation.
Imagine an argument between two scientists, Maggie and Bob, about the distribution of
outcomes for some experiment X . Maggie believes m is the correct distribution while
Bob thinks the real distribution is b. Even though the Re´nyi divergence was specifically
designed as a measure of disagreement between distributions, Fig. 1A provides the two
scientists with little practical intuition on the extent of their disagreement (not to mention
any idea on how it can be resolved).
Maggie happens to be very rich so she decides to prove her point by offering a fair price (2)
for any game regarding the experiment. This gives Bob a chance to defend his view by
demonstrating a sizeable profit.
By transforming the data in Fig. 1A into financial returns (Fig. 1B) Bob understands
the extent of his disagreement with Maggie. Specifically, he expects to make a return in
the range between 4.8%-6.9% per run of the experiment1 (without taking uncomfortable
1The actual returns are random but, in the long run, Bob can hope to achieve the expected growth
of Fig. 1B almost surely by simple repetition, i.e. by reinvesting the actual returns from one run of the
experiment into the next. This is, of course, assuming that Bob’s belief b turns out to be correct. In
general, the long-term realized returns will follow an instance of Eq. (10) where p is chosen to coincide
with the correct (i.e. the realized) distribution.
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1 Transforming the Re´nyi divergence into financial returns.
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(A) Dα(b||m) as a function of α for some pair of distributions b and m. In general, this is a nondecreasing
function which, typically, monotonically increases spanning a broad range of values (e.g. from zero to infinity).
This hinders the use of Dα as an intuitive measure.
(B) The equivalent expected financial returns plotted as a function of risk aversion. The domain is restricted
to the observed levels of risk aversion for real investors. The numerical returns are per single draw of the
underlying random variable. For a detailed discussion see the main text.
The profiles A and B can be derived from each other, thus all of the mathematical content is preserved. The
profile B adds financial interpretation to the typically featureless profile A.
risks, i.e. staying within normal bounds for risk aversion).
These returns are very high. Given a statistically significant set of 100 runs, for example,
Bob would expect his capital to grow between 120 to 986 times. The enormity of these
expected returns should be obvious to anyone who has ever had a bank account.
In the above example Maggie took on the extra responsibility of “making the market”.
This was useful to simplify the illustration. In the most general practical case we might
be dealing with multiple players each with their own believed distribution, risk aversion
and a limited budget, and there might not be anybody among the players brave enough
to make the market. In this case the market should form spontaneously (assuming,
of course, everyone can see the opportunity). The corresponding distribution m would
be computed as explained in Appendix V of Ref. [9]. For example, a group of growth-
optimizing investors with views {bi(x)} and budgets {wi} will form a market with m(x) =∑
i wibi(x)/
∑
k wk. Whether the market forms spontaneously or is made by one of the
players, equations (9) and (10) hold for every individual investor.
3 Discussion
Throughout history, mankind’s ability to plan and optimize was key to our survival. We
should not be too surprised that this ability can produce strong statistical intuition. The
real question is how we can expand and use this intuition in practice.
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The expansion of the intuition beyond the Re´nyi divergence can be done along the same
lines as we explored in this paper – by extending the class of investors even further (see
Appendix).
Regarding practical applications, we have shown that framing statistical disagreements in
terms of financial optimization quantifies the amount of disagreement in a way that is both
intuitive and scientifically sound. Perhaps even more importantly, this approach can be
useful for closing real disagreements in a cooperative manner. It would be very interesting,
for instance, to see what financial returns modern climatology can demonstrate in a game
against the sceptics of climate change. We can set up such a game just as we did above for
Maggie and Bob. All we would need are concrete examples of some relevant probability
distributions (preferably with short time horizons to facilitate convergence via repetition).
The financial attractiveness of the optimized investments is directly related to the amount
of genuine disagreement between participants. The optimization ensures the disagreement
is utilized to its full potential (from the point of view of each individual participant).
Following the optimization, failure to trade would imply that either the disagreement is
not large enough (relative to other investment opportunities) or the disagreement itself is
not genuine (i.e. it fails to capture the real problem).
Appendix
The connection between divergence measures and investment behaviors turns out to be
rather general. Consider for instance a general investor whose relative risk aversion is
a function of the payoff, i.e. R = R(F ). Equation (3) shows that the corresponding
optimal payoff is a function of the growth-optimizing payoff F (f) = F (b/m), so the
expected logarithmic rate of return takes the form
EbRate[F ] =
∫
b(x)φ
(
m(x)
b(x)
)
dx (13)
for some function φ. This is exactly the form of the φ-divergence measures which were
introduced and studied independently in Refs. [10], [11] and [12]. The financial inter-
pretation thus naturally extends to a very broad class of divergence measures. Different
divergence measures appear connected to different investment behaviors.
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